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ABSTRACT 
  Is federal diversity jurisdiction case specific or claim specific? The 
complete-diversity rule makes clear that, when a diversity defect is 
noted in a putative diversity action, the court lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction over that action as a whole. But does the court’s 
jurisdiction nevertheless extend to claims between diverse parties, such 
that the case continues if the nondiverse spoiler is dismissed? 
  We engage this persistent and unsettled question by identifying and 
exploring two possible answers, each based on a distinct theory of 
subject-matter jurisdiction that boasts doctrinal support. The first we 
denote “joint jurisdiction”—an all-or-nothing theory—under which a 
diversity defect contaminates the whole case and deprives the court of 
jurisdiction over claims between diverse parties too. The second we 
denote “several jurisdiction”—a claim-by-claim theory—under which 
the court lacks jurisdiction over claims between nondiverse parties but 
always had, and continues to have, jurisdiction over claims between 
diverse parties. 
  We then offer a way to reconcile these seemingly incompatible 
theories and precedent: shifting the time of jurisdictional assessment 
from the time of filing in federal court to the time of dismissal of the 
jurisdictional spoiler. We also discuss how that solution potentially 
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creates new tensions, particularly regarding the notion that a court 
without subject-matter jurisdiction over an action may nonetheless 
render a binding adjudication of claims within that action. Finally, we 
explain how the application of other jurisdictional authorizations—
including the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine and the 
jurisdictional-resequencing doctrine—might alleviate tensions created 
by our time-shifting proposal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Diversity jurisdiction is an odd duck. It empowers federal courts 
to adjudicate certain state-law claims based on a risk, or the 
appearance of a risk, of state bias against out-of-state litigants.1 That 
rationale is perplexing in a federalist system today that presumes the 
competence of state courts to adjudicate issues without such bias2 and 
 
 1. See Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (explaining that the 
traditional rationale of diversity jurisdiction is to reduce “the possible fears and apprehensions” 
of out-of-state litigants that the state court will be biased against them). But see Henry J. 
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 495–99 (1928) 
(arguing that the real reason was to advance corporate interests opposed by antibusiness state 
legislatures and judges). 
 2. See Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59–60 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). In Elbert, Justice Frankfurter asked, 
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that requires federal courts to apply the same substantive law as state 
courts would.3 In addition, the state-bias rationale has morphed 
inconsistently over time, from an early probusiness rationale to 
protecting distant plaintiffs from the political power of local 
corporations to today protecting large corporations from being forced 
to defend against multistate class actions in certain plaintiff-friendly 
state courts.4 Further, diversity jurisdiction can be invoked even when 
the bias rationale is turned on its head, such as when an in-state 
plaintiff invokes diversity jurisdiction.5 Yet through these changes, 
and despite calls for limiting or even eliminating diversity 
jurisdiction,6 the doctrine has been a mainstay of federal dockets for 
more than two hundred years. 
In the ongoing policy debate about the scope and propriety of 
diversity jurisdiction, basic technical oddities of diversity jurisdiction 
have gone overlooked. Diversity jurisdiction, unlike its younger 
 
Can it fairly be said that state tribunals are not now established on a sufficiently ‘good 
footing’ to adjudicate state litigation that arises between citizens of different States, 
including the artificial corporate citizens, when they are the only resort for the much 
larger volume of the same type of litigation between their own citizens? Can the state 
tribunals not yet be trusted to mete out justice to nonresident litigants; should 
resident litigants not be compelled to trust their own state tribunals? 
Id.; see also Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87 (assuming “that the tribunals of the states will 
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation”); Friendly, supra note 1, at 493 (arguing 
that there is no evidence of state-court bias); see generally Scott Dodson, The Gravitational 
Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703 (2016) (demonstrating that state courts tend to 
decide issues of state law by mimicking federal-court interpretations of analogous federal law). 
 3. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 4. Compare Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 329 (1853) (“The 
right of choosing an impartial tribunal is a privilege of no small practical importance, and more 
especially in cases where a distant plaintiff has to contend with the power and influence . . . 
wielded by corporations in almost any state.”), with Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
109-2, § 2(a)(4)(B), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005) (“Abuses in class actions undermine the national 
judicial system . . . in that State and local courts are . . . sometimes acting in ways that 
demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants . . . .”). See also Friendly, supra note 1, at 496–
97 (“[W]e may say that the desire to protect creditors against legislation favorable to debtors 
was a principal reason for the grant of diversity jurisdiction.”). Some have suggested that the 
most persuasive rationale is not about bias at all, but rather is about preserving attorney choice 
of forum. See Charles Alan Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law 
Institute Proposals, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 207 (1969). 
 5. See, e.g., Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 348 U.S. at 54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 6. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 139–47 
(1985); Rodney K. Miller, Article III and Removal Jurisdiction: The Demise of the Complete 
Diversity Rule and a Proposed Return to Minimal Diversity, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 312–13 
(2012); Thomas D. Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential 
for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 966 (1979). 
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sibling federal-question jurisdiction,7 is grounded in the character of 
the parties rather than the character of the claim. This feature makes 
diversity jurisdiction both more complicated than federal-question 
jurisdiction and more susceptible to party gamesmanship. Compliance 
with the diversity requirements can be difficult to determine. That 
difficulty is particularly problematic in the context of subject-matter 
jurisdiction—if a federal court lacks jurisdiction, it has no power to 
proceed, even if the case had been litigated productively for years.8 
The difficulty of assessing compliance with the strictures of 
diversity jurisdiction is exacerbated by the longstanding “complete 
diversity” interpretation of the general diversity-jurisdiction statute: 
all plaintiffs must be diverse in citizenship from all defendants.9 The 
purported rationale of the complete-diversity rule is that the presence 
of same-state opponents neutralizes any state bias and thus obviates 
the need for federal jurisdiction.10 
One nettlesome but unsettled complication of the requirement of 
complete diversity is simply illustrated. Consider a suit in federal 
court in which a single plaintiff from Texas asserts state-law claims 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the “judicial Power” to “all cases, in law and equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under their authority”); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.”). 
 8. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884). For 
arguments limiting this impact, see Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
1439, 1442 (2011); Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2008). 
 9. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (“The court understands 
these expressions to mean, that each distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of 
whom are entitled to sue . . . in the federal courts.”); 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 3605 (3d ed. 2014) (stating that “the Strawbridge rule has been followed for more than two 
centuries”). The complete-diversity rule applies only to § 1332, not to Article III’s grant of 
diversity jurisdiction or to other statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction. See State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (holding Article III to authorize the exercise of 
diversity jurisdiction as long as there exists “minimal diversity,” meaning that at least one 
plaintiff in the action is diverse in citizenship from at least one defendant); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 
(2012) (authorizing minimal diversity jurisdiction for statutory interpleader); id. § 1332(d) 
(authorizing minimal diversity jurisdiction for certain class actions). 
 10. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3605 (“The presumed theory behind the original 
grant of diversity jurisdiction . . . was to provide a neutral, national forum for cases in which 
there would be a danger of bias in a state court . . . . This justification . . . does not apply to cases 
in which there are citizens from the same state on opposing sides . . . .”); David Currie, The 
Federal Courts and the American Law Institute Part I, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18 (1968); see also 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 564 (2005) (“A failure of complete 
diversity . . . contaminates every claim in the action.”). 
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against two defendants—one from California and the other from 
Texas—and alleges claims for $500,000 against each defendant. It is 
beyond dispute that the federal court lacks diversity jurisdiction over 
the plaintiff’s claim against the nondiverse Texas defendant, and thus 
lacks diversity jurisdiction over the action as a whole. But does the 
court nevertheless have jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim against 
the diverse California defendant? If no, then the court must dismiss 
the entire case. If yes, then the court could dismiss the nondiverse 
claim and proceed with the diverse claim. 
This is not an idle question. Diversity actions make up more than 
a third of the federal docket, and multiparty and multiclaim diversity 
suits are common.11 Yet many of these cases in fact lack complete 
diversity.12 Because a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised 
at any time and formally nullifies any progress that the parties have 
achieved, the economic downsides of diversity contamination for 
diverse litigants are considerable.13 
We propose that the answer to this question requires 
consideration of two primary, and seemingly irreconcilable, 
conceptions of subject-matter jurisdiction. The first—what we refer to 
as “joint jurisdiction”—holds that the presence of the jurisdictional 
spoiler contaminates other claims in the action, such that the federal 
court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the diverse claim as well. In 
other words, the claims must stand or fall together as one action. 
The second theory—what we refer to as “several jurisdiction”—
holds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the nondiverse claim but 
has always had, and continues to have, jurisdiction over the diverse 
claim. In other words, the jurisdictional status of the claims is 
determined severally, on a claim-by-claim basis. 
Which of these jurisdictional conceptions is correct? Supreme 
Court opinions dating as far back as 1824 seem to support joint 
jurisdiction in the context of the complete-diversity requirement.14 
Yet a separate and equally longstanding tradition considers that same 
requirement on a claim-by-claim basis, suggesting that spoiling claims 
 
 11. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014 Tables, U.S. District Courts—Civil, tbls. C 
to C-5, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-
statistics-2014-tables [http://perma.cc/6254-SNBN] (last updated Mar. 31, 2014). 
 12. See, e.g., United Republic Ins. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d 168, 170 (2d Cir. 
2003) (“We have previously expressed a concern that cases brought in federal courts in which 
diversity of citizenship is not properly alleged and/or does not exist are far too common.”). 
 13. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006).  
 14. See infra Part I.A. 
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may be individually dismissed to preserve jurisdiction over claims 
between diverse parties.15 The doctrine, it turns out, is conflicted. 
We engage this conflict and offer four contributions. First, in 
Part I, we set out a descriptive account of joint and several diversity 
jurisdiction and demonstrate that both theories boast doctrinal 
support, making a binary choice between one or the other both 
tenuous and inherently disruptive. Second, we offer in Part II an 
analytical middle ground for resolving the competing traditions of 
joint and several jurisdiction, namely, shifting the time of 
jurisdictional assessment from the time of filing to a later point in the 
litigation. Third, in Part III, we consider new concerns that this 
middle approach generates, especially the problematic authority of a 
federal court to render binding decisions in an action over which it 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Lastly, we explain in Part IV how 
those concerns can be mitigated by other jurisdictional 
authorizations, including the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction 
doctrine and the jurisdictional-resequencing doctrine. By unpacking 
the problems of this understudied feature of diversity jurisdiction, we 
hope to bring closer attention to the fundamental but oft-overlooked 
complexities of diversity jurisdiction as a whole. 
I.  COMPETING THEORIES OF COMPLETE DIVERSITY 
As an abstract principle, the complete-diversity rule is 
straightforward enough: every plaintiff in the action must be diverse 
in citizenship from every defendant. But determining the precise 
effect that a violation of the rule has upon a court’s jurisdiction in a 
particular case can be a complicated exercise. The primary cause of 
this complexity is the existence of two competing notions of subject-
matter jurisdiction, which we designate as “joint jurisdiction” and 
“several jurisdiction.” Either of these might inform a court’s 
assessment of its jurisdiction upon discovering a failure of complete 
diversity. 
Joint jurisdiction insists that a federal court treat the various 
claims asserted in a diversity action as an indivisible action rather 
than a set of separate and distinct units. Joint jurisdiction is thus 
fittingly regarded as an all-or-nothing approach: either the court has 
jurisdiction over all claims in the action or none of them. When 
applying joint jurisdiction to address a violation of the complete-
 
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
DODSON AND PUCILLO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2016  12:17 PM 
2016] JOINT AND SEVERAL JURISDICTION 1329 
diversity requirement, a court would not consider that its jurisdiction 
over claims between diverse parties would have attached at the outset 
of the action had the complaint simply omitted the nondiverse 
parties. The mere presence of a claim between nondiverse parties 
would oblige the court to dismiss the entire action, including any 
claims between diverse parties. 
In contrast, several jurisdiction allows a federal court to engage 
in a claim-specific analysis in connection with a putative diversity 
action.16 By regarding the claims asserted in such an action severally, 
that is, as separate and distinct units of a larger set, a court would 
have jurisdiction over claims between diverse parties even though the 
presence of a diversity spoiler would preclude complete diversity over 
the action as a whole. Consequently, although incomplete diversity 
would prevent the court from proceeding with the claims between 
nondiverse parties, the court’s jurisdiction over claims between 
diverse parties would endure, and the court could proceed with them 
after dismissing the jurisdictional spoilers.17 
In this Part, we offer detailed accounts of joint jurisdiction and 
several jurisdiction and document how each theory has enjoyed 
doctrinal support. 
A. Joint Jurisdiction 
The current statutory authorization for diversity jurisdiction—28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)—provides that district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of specified “civil actions.”18 Like its statutory forebear—
the Judiciary Act of 178919—§ 1332(a) contemplates that something 
more than an individual claim is the proper unit of measure for a 
 
 16. See John B. Oakley, Integrating Supplemental Jurisdiction and Diversity Jurisdiction: A 
Progress Report on the Work of the American Law Institute, 74 IND. L.J. 25, 45 (1998) (asserting 
that federal diversity jurisdiction “can be understood and honored—indeed, better understood 
and more coherently and consistently honored—when viewed through the lens of the claim-
specific model of original jurisdiction”). 
 17. Id. at 52 (contending that the complete-diversity rule “does require the dismissal of the 
jurisdictional spoilers, even when the claims by or against the nondiverse parties are so related 
to the claims involving diverse parties that they could be adjudicated were the statute to call 
merely for minimal rather than complete diversity among all parties joined in the complaint”). 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is 
between . . . citizens of different States . . . .”). 
 19. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress vested the newly created circuit courts with 
original diversity jurisdiction over specified “suits of a civil nature.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 
20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (emphasis added). 
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federal court’s jurisdiction.20 As Professor Joan Steinman has written, 
“[w]hen persons knowledgeable of federal civil procedure think of a 
civil action, we normally conceive of the collection of claims and 
defenses” rather than individual claims.21 
Almost from the beginning, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
Congress’s grant of diversity jurisdiction as conferring joint 
jurisdiction. In Strawbridge v. Curtiss,22 a pithy but momentous 
opinion construing the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court confronted an 
action between multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, where 
both sides included citizens of Massachusetts.23 Affirming the federal 
circuit court’s dismissal for lack of diversity jurisdiction, the Court 
construed the Act as requiring that “each distinct interest should be 
represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be 
sued, in the federal courts.”24 “That is,” the Court expounded, “that 
where the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in that 
interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those 
courts.”25 With Massachusetts citizens on both sides of the litigation, a 
necessary condition for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction—that 
each of the plaintiffs has the capacity to sue each of the defendants in 
federal court—was absent.26 
Strawbridge recognized a statutory requirement of complete 
diversity of citizenship, which Congress has not seen fit to supersede 
for more than two hundred years.27 Notably, the Court chose dismissal 
 
 20. See Joan Steinman, Claims, Civil Actions, Congress & the Court: Limiting the 
Reasoning of Cases Construing Poorly Drawn Statutes, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1593, 1608–09 
(2008) (arguing that existing doctrine allows multiple claims to comprise a single “civil action”). 
 21. Id. at 1603–04. 
 22. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
 23. Id. at 267. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1424 
(7th ed. 2015) (questioning the interpretation of Strawbridge but acknowledging that “the 
decision has consistently been interpreted more broadly . . . as requiring ‘complete’ diversity”); 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3605 (observing that, aside from three specific exceptions, “the 
Strawbridge rule has been followed for more than two centuries”). Indeed, in 1989, Congress 
passed the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, which reinforced the rule of complete diversity. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2012). It has been reported that John Marshall came to regret his 
opinion in Strawbridge. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1829, 1881 (2007); see also Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 
497, 555 (1844) (“We remark too, that the cases of Strawbridge . . . and Deveaux have never 
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of the entire action as the appropriate remedy for noncompliance 
with that requirement, rather than insisting that the circuit court 
exercise jurisdiction over the claims between any plaintiffs and 
defendants who were diverse in citizenship. The parties were capable 
of suing or being sued in federal court only if the complaint omitted 
nondiverse parties. Although explicitly reserving judgment as to 
whether the complete-diversity rule would govern “where several 
parties represent several distinct interests, and some of those parties 
are, and others are not, competent to sue, or liable to be sued,”28 the 
Court was clear that all claims in the case before it were to be 
dismissed. At least for joint claims, then, Strawbridge supports the 
theory of joint jurisdiction. 
A more recent endorsement of joint jurisdiction emerged in 
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.29 Owen involved a 
wrongful-death action filed in federal court against Omaha Public 
Power District (OPPD) by Geraldine Kroger.30 Because Kroger and 
OPPD were citizens of Iowa and Nebraska, respectively, the district 
court’s jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship under 
§ 1332(a) at the outset of the action.31 However, after OPPD 
impleaded Owen Equipment & Erection Co. as a third-party 
defendant,32 Kroger amended her complaint to join Owen as an 
additional direct defendant.33 Importantly, in its answer to the 
amended complaint, Owen did not specifically deny Kroger’s 
allegation that Owen was a Nebraska corporation that had its 
principal place of business in Nebraska.34 
After the district court entered summary judgment for OPPD,35 
which concluded OPPD’s involvement as a party, the action 
proceeded to trial solely as to Kroger’s claims against Owen.36 It was 
only then that Owen revealed that its principal place of business was 
in Iowa, thereby establishing that it shared Iowan citizenship with 
 
been satisfactory to the bar, and that they were not, especially the last, entirely satisfactory to 
the [C]ourt that made them.”). 
 28. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267–68. 
 29. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
 30. Id. at 367. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 367–68. 
 33. Id. at 368. 
 34. Id. at 368–69. 
 35. Id. at 368. 
 36. Id. 
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Kroger.37 The district court nonetheless refused to dismiss the case for 
lack of jurisdiction and proceeded to enter judgment for Kroger after 
the jury returned a verdict in her favor.38 The Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed that judgment on appeal, reasoning that 
the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Kroger’s claims 
against Owen was proper under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.39 
Reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction over Kroger’s claims against Owen.40 
The Court emphasized that § 1332(a) “and its predecessors have 
consistently been held to require complete diversity of citizenship,”41 
meaning that “diversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each 
defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.”42 
Kroger could not, therefore, have joined Owen as an additional direct 
defendant in her original complaint against OPPD because Iowa 
citizens would have been on both sides of the litigation.43 The Court 
then observed that this same arrangement is precisely what Kroger 
had deployed in her amended complaint.44 Consequently, when she 
filed that pleading, “[c]omplete diversity was destroyed just as surely 
as if she had sued Owen initially” because “‘the matter in 
controversy’ could not be ‘between . . . citizens of different states.’”45 
 
 37. Id. at 369; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (providing that, for purposes of federal 
diversity jurisdiction, “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State . . . by which 
it has been incorporated and of the State . . . where it has its principal place of business” 
(emphasis added)). 
 38. Owen, 437 U.S. at 369. 
 39. Id. at 369–70. The Eighth Circuit determined that ancillary jurisdiction was applicable 
because Kroger’s claims against Owen arose from the same core of operative facts as her claims 
against OPPD. Id. at 369. It further determined that, because Owen had concealed its Iowan 
citizenship from Kroger until trial, the district court had properly exercised its discretion to 
invoke ancillary jurisdiction. Id. 
 40. Id. at 377 n.21 (“Our holding is that the District Court lacked power to entertain 
[Kroger’s] lawsuit against [Owen].”). 
 41. Id. at 373. 
 42. Id.; see id. at 373–74 (“Whatever may have been the original purposes of diversity-of-
citizenship jurisdiction, this subsequent history clearly demonstrates a congressional mandate 
that diversity jurisdiction is not to be available when any plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as 
any defendant.”). 
 43. Id. at 374. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012)). 
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Steadfastly defending the requirement of complete diversity,46 
the Court reasoned that, if ancillary jurisdiction extended to the 
claims at issue, plaintiffs could circumvent the complete-diversity rule 
simply by “suing only those defendants who were of diverse 
citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants.”47 
The Court was also concerned that, if ancillary jurisdiction were 
extended to a plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse party who had 
been previously joined in the litigation as a third-party defendant, 
there would be no legitimate basis to refuse to extend the doctrine to 
the same plaintiff’s claim against that same nondiverse party if it were 
joined in the original complaint.48 The Court insisted that such an 
outcome would allow the complete-diversity rule to be “evaded 
completely.”49 
Owen can be viewed as supportive of the theory of joint 
jurisdiction. It is true that the Owen Court did not explicitly address 
whether the filing of Kroger’s amended complaint affected the district 
court’s jurisdiction over her claims against OPPD. Nor did the Court 
explicitly address whether the district court’s jurisdiction over 
Kroger’s claims against OPPD would have been established in the 
first instance had her original complaint named Owen as an 
additional direct defendant. However, throughout its discussion, the 
Court consistently framed the complete-diversity rule as an all-or-
nothing requirement. Nothing in Owen endorses the power of a 
district court to exercise jurisdiction over claims between diverse 
parties in the absence of complete diversity. 
Justice White’s dissenting opinion confirms this understanding of 
Owen. Reacting to the Court’s endorsement of joint jurisdiction, 
Justice White offered an alternative perspective of several 
jurisdiction: “The complete-diversity requirement, of course, could be 
viewed as meaning that in a diversity case, a federal district court may 
adjudicate only those claims that are between parties of different 
States.”50 
Almost thirty years after Owen, the Supreme Court revisited the 
subject of joint jurisdiction in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
 
 46. Id. at 377 (“Congress has established the basic rule that diversity jurisdiction exists 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 only when there is complete diversity of citizenship. The policy of the 
statute calls for its strict construction.”). 
 47. Id. at 374. 
 48. Id. at 374–75. 
 49. Id. at 375. 
 50. Id. at 380 (White, J., dissenting). 
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Services, Inc.51 Allapattah arose from two separate actions that were 
filed in federal court and premised solely on diversity of citizenship.52 
Unlike in Strawbridge and Owen, however, neither action involved a 
lack of complete diversity. Instead, the jurisdictional concern in each 
action was that at least one plaintiff—but not all plaintiffs—satisfied 
the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332(a).53 The claims of 
the plaintiffs who did not meet the amount-in-controversy 
requirement could not, therefore, fall within the district court’s 
original diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a).54 The question before 
the Supreme Court was whether the district court could nonetheless 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.55 
To resolve that question, the Court first had to determine the 
meaning of a key phrase in the supplemental-jurisdiction statute.56 
Section 1367(a) of that statute provides, 
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction 
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.57 
 
 51. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). 
 52. Id. at 550–51. 
 53. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . .”). 
 54. Under § 1332, each plaintiff must independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy 
requirement. See Clark v. Paul Grey, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939) (“[W]hen several plaintiffs 
assert separate and distinct demands in a single suit, the amount involved in each separate 
controversy must be of the requisite amount to be within the jurisdiction of the district court, 
and . . . those amounts cannot be added together to satisfy jurisdictional requirements.”). This 
principle applies equally to a putative class action in which the named plaintiffs satisfy the 
amount-in-controversy requirement, but members of the class do not. See Zahn v. Int’l Paper 
Co., 414 U.S. 219, 301 (1973) (“Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the 
jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case—one 
plaintiff may not ride on another’s coattails.”). Of course, as Allapattah holds, the supplemental-
jurisdiction statute, enacted after Clark and Zahn, authorizes a district court to retain the 
jurisdictionally insufficient claims that those cases previously required to be dismissed. 
Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 566. 
 55. See Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 549 (stating the question as “whether a federal court in a 
diversity action may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims 
do not satisfy the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement, provided the claims are part of 
the same case or controversy as the claims of plaintiffs who do allege a sufficient amount in 
controversy”). 
 56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
 57. Id. § 1367(a). 
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Under this language, a threshold requirement for a district court’s 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) is the presence 
of a “civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction.”58 The availability of supplemental jurisdiction in the 
cases before the Court, therefore, rested upon the appropriate scope 
of a “civil action” within the meaning of the statute. Does a “civil 
action” necessarily encompass all of the claims asserted in the 
complaint? Or can a “civil action” encompass only the jurisdictionally 
sufficient claims, leaving the jurisdictionally insufficient claims 
eligible for supplemental jurisdiction? 
The Court’s resolution of this thorny statutory issue resulted in 
the application of different theories of subject-matter jurisdiction to 
the respective requirements of § 1332(a). For the amount-in-
controversy requirement, the Court endorsed a claim-by-claim basis 
in accordance with a theory of several jurisdiction. The purpose of the 
amount-in-controversy requirement, the Court observed, is “to 
ensure that a dispute is sufficiently important to warrant federal-court 
attention.”59 Because the presence of one jurisdictionally sufficient 
claim establishes that importance despite the presence of additional 
jurisdictionally insufficient claims,60 the Court rejected the joint-
jurisdiction notion “that a district court lacks original jurisdiction over 
a civil action unless the court has original jurisdiction over every 
claim in the complaint.”61 A “civil action” within the meaning of 
§ 1367(a) could thus encompass only the jurisdictionally sufficient 
claims,62 allowing supplemental jurisdiction to attach to other claims 
failing the amount-in-controversy requirement.63 The upshot is that, 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 562. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 560. 
 62. Id. at 549 (“When the well-pleaded complaint contains at least one claim that satisfies 
the amount-in-controversy requirement, [the court] has original jurisdiction over a ‘civil action’ 
within the meaning of § 1367(a), even if the civil action over which it has jurisdiction comprises 
fewer claims than were included in the complaint.”). 
 63. Id. (“[W]here the other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named 
plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367 does authorize 
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same Article III case or 
controversy . . . .”). Of course, the restrictions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) might prohibit the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims of certain plaintiffs who do not satisfy the 
amount-in-controversy requirement, even when such supplemental jurisdiction would be 
authorized under § 1367(a), but those kinds of plaintiffs were not at issue in Allapattah. See id. 
at 560 (“Nothing in the text of § 1367(b) . . . withholds supplemental jurisdiction over the claims 
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for the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332(a), the Court 
took a claim-by-claim, several-jurisdiction approach. 
In contrast to the several-jurisdiction approach to the amount-in-
controversy requirement, the Court made clear that joint jurisdiction 
was the proper mode of analysis for the complete-diversity 
requirement: “A failure of complete diversity, unlike the failure of 
some claims to meet the requisite amount in controversy, 
contaminates every claim in the action.”64 The Court supported this 
approach by observing that the purpose of the complete-diversity 
requirement “is to provide a federal forum for important disputes 
where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-
state litigants.”65 Because “[t]he presence of parties from the same 
State on both sides of a case dispels this concern,”66 a single 
nondiverse claim “deprives the district court of original diversity 
jurisdiction over the entire action.”67 The Court thus concluded that 
an action involving a complete-diversity violation cannot constitute a 
“civil action” that would allow for the exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction under § 1367(a). As the Court stated, “[i]ncomplete 
diversity destroys original jurisdiction with respect to all claims, so 
there is nothing to which supplemental jurisdiction can adhere.”68 
Even the dissenting justices in Allapattah appear to have agreed 
with the Court’s endorsement of joint jurisdiction as it relates to 
complete-diversity violations. The dissenters took as a starting point 
the Court’s joint-jurisdiction approach to complete diversity and 
would have applied it equally to the amount-in-controversy 
requirement.69 
 
of plaintiffs permissively joined under Rule 20 . . . or certified as class-action members pursuant 
to Rule 23 . . . .”). 
 64. Id. at 564; see id. at 566 (“[T]he special nature and purpose of the diversity requirement 
mean[s] that a single nondiverse party can contaminate every other claim in the lawsuit . . . .”); 
id. at 556 (“[Since 1789], the diversity requirement in § 1332(a) required complete diversity; 
absent complete diversity, the district court lacked original jurisdiction over all of the claims in 
the action . . . .”). 
 65. Id. at 553–54. 
 66. Id. at 554; see id. at 562 (stating that “the presence of nondiverse parties on both sides 
of a lawsuit eliminates the justification for providing a federal forum”); see also WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 9, § 3605 (stating that the “justification for granting federal diversity jurisdiction does 
not apply to cases in which there are citizens from the same state on opposing sides of the 
litigation”). 
 67. Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 564 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. at 584, 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[D]iversity must be ‘complete,’ i.e., all parties 
on plaintiffs’ side must be diverse from all parties on defendants’ side. . . . In contrast to the 
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Notably, the established practice regarding removal of actions 
from state court to federal court tends to confirm the joint-
jurisdiction approach of complete diversity. Although Congress could 
set a different standard for removal than for original jurisdiction, 
Congress has opted to make removal authorization generally 
derivative of original jurisdiction and thus incorporate the complete-
diversity rule.70 In light of that, the Supreme Court has consistently 
restricted diversity removal to cases in which all plaintiffs are citizens 
of states different from all defendants.71 In addition, the Court has 
long interpreted the removal statute to prohibit partial removal.72 
Indeed, removal procedure throughout the nation’s history, with one 
swiftly corrected exception, has been whole-case removal.73 Removal 
therefore reflects the approach of joint jurisdiction for diversity 
cases.74 
 
Court’s construction of § 1367 . . . the interpretation presented here does not sever [diversity 
and the amount-in-controversy components].”); see also Steinman, supra note 20, at 1636 
(interpreting the dissent to “believe that the fact patterns presented no civil actions within 
original federal jurisdiction because the monetarily-insufficient claims of some plaintiffs 
prevented there from being any action within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts”). 
 70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (“Any civil action brought in a State court of which the 
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction may be removed . . . .”); City of 
Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (“The propriety of removal thus depends 
on whether the case originally could have been filed in federal court.”); Scott Dodson, In Search 
of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 61 (2008) (observing that § 1441(a) 
incorporates the complete-diversity rule). Exceptions do exist. See Dodson, supra, at 61–65. 
 71. See, e.g., Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 209 (1880). 
 72. Id. (“If the whole suit could not be removed, no part of it could be taken from the State 
court.”); see also Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The Improper Party 
Problem in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 788 (2006) (“[A] diverse defendant 
joined with a diversity spoiler has no statutory vehicle to seek removal on the basis that he has a 
‘diversity suit’ unfairly (and perhaps intentionally) trapped inside a larger non-removable 
action.”). 
 73. In the Separable Controversy Act, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866), Congress experimented 
with “allow[ing] a diverse defendant to remove his part of the case to federal court—despite the 
presence of joined, nondiverse co-defendants—if the case against him was ‘separable’ from the 
case against the other defendants,” Hines & Gensler, supra note 72, at 785–86, but the 
experiment was such a failure of confusion and inefficiency, see Edward Hartnett, A New Trick 
from an Old and Abused Dog: Section 1441(c) Lives and Now Permits the Remand of Federal 
Question Cases, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1099, 1157 (1995), that Congress quickly restored whole-
case removal, see Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. The removal statute does allow 
partial remand for “separate and independent claim[s],” but that provision has never played 
much of a role in diversity-jurisdiction removal, and, today, is expressly reserved for federal-
question removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). 
 74. Whole-case removal seems grounded in solid policy considerations. See Steinman, 
supra note 20, at 1645 (“The ability to remove individual claims would be a potent weapon in 
the arsenal of defendants who sought to burden plaintiffs with the substantial costs and other 
inconveniences of parallel litigation.”); id. (“[T]he number of occasions when res judicata or 
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Thus, from Strawbridge to Owen to Allapattah, the Supreme 
Court has maintained a longstanding endorsement of joint 
jurisdiction with respect to the complete-diversity requirement. 
B. Several Jurisdiction 
In a separate line of precedent, however, the Court has 
cultivated a tradition of applying the claim-specific approach of 
several jurisdiction to complete-diversity violations. 
As early as 1825,75 the Court recognized that diversity-destroying 
parties could be dismissed to salvage complete diversity. Carneal v. 
Banks76 arose out of an alleged breach of contract between Carneal 
and Banks for an exchange of land.77 Banks brought suit in federal 
circuit court, asserting that Carneal fraudulently misrepresented good 
title to the land and its value.78 When Carneal subsequently died, 
Banks sued Carneal’s heirs to have the contract rescinded and title to 
the land restored as before the contract. Banks also sued the heirs of 
Harvie, the previous owner of Banks’s land, to ensure that title to the 
land remained with Banks. Carneal’s heirs were not citizens of 
Virginia, but Banks and Harvie’s heirs were all citizens of Virginia.79 
Nevertheless, the court entered a decree for Banks upon a jury 
verdict.80 
On appeal from the decree, Carneal’s heirs argued that the 
incomplete diversity among Banks and Harvie’s heirs deprived the 
circuit court of jurisdiction over the entire action.81 In rejecting that 
contention, the Supreme Court stated that jurisdiction over a claim 
 
collateral estoppel could bite a litigant could greatly multiply.”); id. at 1646 (“[T]hese 
consequences would undermine the goals of efficiency, convenience, cost-savings, and 
avoidance of both duplication and the creation of unnecessary and potentially complex issues.”). 
Of course, whole-case removal has its share of downsides as well. See Hines & Gensler, supra 
note 72, at 781–82. 
 75. The idea perhaps originates with Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 91 (1816), in which two plaintiffs sought ejectment as joint heirs in a diversity action, 
but one plaintiff was incapable of suing in diversity because he was a citizen of a U.S. territory 
rather than a state. Id. at 91–92. The Court held jurisdiction was lacking over the entire action, 
but only because the ejectment action was an indivisible joint claim. Id. at 95. In dicta, the Court 
surmised that, had the plaintiffs elected to sue severally, the spoiling plaintiff could have been 
dropped to preserve the remainder of the action. Id. 
 76. Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825). 
 77. Id. at 182. 
 78. Id. at 182–83. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 187. 
 81. Id. at 187–88. 
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against a diverse party would be disrupted by the presence of a 
nondiverse party only if the latter were indispensable to the suit.82 
Because Harvie’s heirs were not even proper parties, much less 
indispensable parties,83 they “[could not] affect the jurisdiction of the 
Court as between those parties who [were] properly before it.”84 
Four years later, the Court applied a similar claim-specific 
approach in Conolly v. Taylor.85 There, foreign nationals and a 
Pennsylvania citizen sued Kentucky defendants and an Ohio 
defendant in a federal circuit court in Kentucky.86 The Judiciary Act 
at that time extended alienage jurisdiction over a suit involving 
aliens,87 and diversity jurisdiction over a “suit . . . between a citizen of 
the State where the suit [was] brought, and a citizen of another 
State.”88 Accordingly, the claims by the foreign nationals against the 
U.S. defendants met the statutory requirements of alienage 
jurisdiction, and the claim by the Pennsylvania plaintiff against the 
Kentucky defendant met the statutory requirements of diversity 
jurisdiction.89 However, the statute did not authorize the circuit court 
to exercise diversity jurisdiction over the claim by the Pennsylvania 
plaintiff against the Ohio defendant because neither was a Kentucky 
citizen.90 Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the Pennsylvania 
plaintiff, proceeded with the rest of the case, and ultimately entered a 
decree.91 
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ 
argument that the initial presence of the Pennsylvania plaintiff 
tainted the whole case such that dismissal of that party could not save 
 
 82. Id. at 188 (“If the validity of this [jurisdictional] objection, so far as respects Harvie’s 
heirs, be unquestionable, it cannot affect the suit against Carneal’s heirs, unless it be 
indispensable to bring Harvie’s heirs before the Court, in order to enable it to decree against 
Carneal’s heirs.”). 
 83. Id. (“[Harvie’s heirs] are made defendants by Banks, under the idea that the title to the 
land sold by him to Carneal was in them; but this is a mistake.”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Conolly v. Taylor, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 556 (1829). 
 86. Id. at 556–57. 
 87. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79 (“[T]he circuit courts shall have 
original cognizance . . . of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where . . . an 
alien is a party . . . .”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id.; Conolly, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 564. 
 90. Conolly, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 564. 
 91. Id. 
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the remaining claims.92 The Court acknowledged that the joinder of 
the Pennsylvania plaintiff prevented the exercise of alienage 
jurisdiction over the claims of the foreign plaintiffs.93 However, the 
simple dismissal of the Pennsylvania plaintiff effectively removed the 
defect and enabled the circuit court to proceed on the basis of 
alienage jurisdiction: “Strike out [the Pennsylvania plaintiff’s] name 
as a complainant, and the impediment is removed to the exercise of 
that original jurisdiction which the court possessed, between the alien 
plaintiffs and all the citizen defendants.”94 
In Horn v. Lockhart,95 another nineteenth-century decision, 
Texas complainants sued both Texas and diverse defendants, 
resulting in incomplete diversity.96 However, rather than dismiss the 
entire suit—a disposition that joint jurisdiction would have 
compelled—the federal circuit court considered the claims severally 
and dismissed only the Texas defendants.97 The court then entered a 
final decree regarding the remaining claims among the completely 
diverse parties.98 
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the 
failure of complete diversity at the time of filing deprived the circuit 
court of jurisdiction over the entire proceeding.99 The Court 
emphasized that, because the Texas defendants were not 
indispensable parties, “their interests were not so interwoven and 
bound up with those of the complainants, or other parties, that no 
decree could be made without necessarily affecting them.”100 
Considering that the rights of the remaining parties were “adequately 
and fully determined without prejudice,”101 the Court was satisfied 
that the jurisdictional defect “was met and obviated by the dismissal 
of the [nondiverse defendants].”102 
 
 92. Id. at 564–65. 
 93. Id. at 565 (“The substantial parties plaintiffs . . . are aliens; and the court has original 
jurisdiction between them and all the defendants. But they prevented the exercise of this 
jurisdiction, by uniting with themselves a person between whom and one of the defendants the 
court cannot take jurisdiction.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570 (1873). 
 96. See id. at 573–74, 579. 
 97. Id. at 574. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 579. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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The preceding cases reveal the Supreme Court’s willingness to 
apply several jurisdiction in order to allow for a defect in complete 
diversity to be cured through dismissal of nondiverse parties prior to 
judgment.103 Somewhat more remarkable is the longstanding practice 
of courts exercising this same authority even after judgment, a 
practice the Court reaffirmed in the 1989 case Newman-Green, Inc. v. 
Alfonzo-Larrain.104 
Newman-Green involved a suit brought by an American 
company against foreign citizens and a U.S. citizen domiciled 
abroad.105 A U.S. party domiciled abroad is neither a foreign citizen 
nor a citizen of any state, but rather a “stateless” American who 
cannot be sued under § 1332.106 Accordingly, the court lacked 
jurisdiction as long as the stateless defendant remained in the case. 
The defect, however, went unnoticed, and the district court 
proceeded to enter judgment against Newman-Green despite the 
absence of diversity jurisdiction.107 Newman-Green appealed. 
The Supreme Court held that a federal court of appeals may, 
under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which allows 
parties to be dropped “at any time” and “on just terms”108), dismiss a 
jurisdictional spoiler in order to preserve a judgment entered in the 
absence of complete diversity.109 The Court first concluded that Rule 
21 authorized district courts, even after entry of judgment, to dismiss 
parties who spoiled diversity.110 The Court then extended this 
authority to federal appellate courts, which had exercised such 
 
 103. For hundreds of years, federal courts have followed this course and held that defects in 
complete diversity can be cured through the dismissal of diversity spoilers. WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 9, § 3608 (“Courts frequently employ Rule 21 to preserve diversity jurisdiction by 
dropping a nondiverse party if that party’s presence in the action is not required under Rule 
19.”). 
 104. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989). 
 105. Id. at 828. 
 106. Id. at 828–29. 
 107. Id. at 828. 
 108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just 
terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”). 
 109. Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 827 (“We decide today that a court of appeals may grant a 
motion to dismiss a dispensable party whose presence spoils statutory diversity jurisdiction.”). 
 110. Id. at 832. 
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authority in prior cases.111 The Court stated it would not “disturb that 
deeply rooted understanding of appellate power.”112 
Newman-Green makes sense from a standpoint of several 
jurisdiction.113 Because the theory of several jurisdiction holds that a 
district court’s jurisdiction over a claim between diverse parties is 
unaffected by a complete-diversity violation, the district court would 
retain separate jurisdiction solely over that claim even though the 
jurisdictional spoiler was still a party to the action at the time of 
judgment. 
By contrast, Newman-Green deviates from the theory of joint 
jurisdiction.114 Under joint jurisdiction, the presence of a jurisdictional 
spoiler would contaminate the diverse claim, depriving the court of 
jurisdiction over all claims. Dismissal of the spoiler, therefore, could 
not “preserve” jurisdiction over the claims between diverse parties 
because no jurisdiction over those claims had ever existed.115 
Thus, in contrast to the joint-jurisdiction line of cases from 
Strawbridge to Owen to Allapattah, the Supreme Court has 
maintained an equally longstanding commitment to several 
jurisdiction in cases like Carneal, Horn, and Newman-Green. 
II.  SOME UNAPPEALING PROPOSALS 
The dissonance resulting from the Supreme Court’s endorsement 
of both joint jurisdiction and several jurisdiction in conjunction with 
the complete-diversity rule invites resolution. But because each 
 
 111. Id. at 833–36. 
 112. Id. at 836; cf. Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181, 188 (1825) (upholding 
jurisdiction, postjudgment, over a completely diverse slice of a case that also involved 
dispensable nondiverse spoilers). 
 113. See Oakley, supra note 16, at 49 (“Newman-Green makes eminent sense if § 1332 is 
understood to vest the district court with original jurisdiction of all claims between diverse 
parties, with the joinder of claims between nondiverse parties raising the distinct issues of the 
scope of the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction over such claims and the necessity of their 
joinder.”). 
 114. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 27, at 1460 (“[If Allapattah] is right that the absence of 
complete diversity means that the entire action has been jurisdictionally contaminated from the 
start, how does one justify the decisions in cases like Newman-Green . . . ?”). Perhaps it is 
unsurprising that Allapattah (authored by Justice Kennedy, who dissented in Newman-Green) 
cites Newman-Green only for mundane principles of the policy rationale for complete diversity. 
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 554 (2005). 
 115. See Oakley, supra note 16, at 48–49 (“If indeed § 1332 confers no jurisdiction over any 
claim unless all claims in an action qualify independently for federal jurisdiction, the effect of 
the dismissal of the jurisdictional spoiler would be to confer retroactively and nonstatutorily the 
power to adjudicate the previously adjudicated claims between the diverse parties.”). 
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tradition boasts substantial doctrinal support, merely picking one 
over the other proves unsatisfying. 
One proposal is to stick with joint jurisdiction for complete 
diversity and limit or reform conflicting traditions of several 
jurisdiction. Professor Steinman, for example, has favored a 
somewhat modified joint-jurisdiction approach to complete diversity, 
though her real focus is on the supplemental-jurisdiction statute.116 
Under her approach, a “civil action” under § 1367(a) is that group of 
all claims and defenses that the Rules and jurisdictional statutes allow 
to be asserted together.117 In her view, joint jurisdiction is consistent 
with the linguistic term of a “civil action” and the pedigree of 
complete diversity.118 
But joint jurisdiction has significant downsides. First, it is 
seemingly incompatible with the longstanding several-jurisdiction 
precedent.119 This theory would limit Rule 21—which allows parties to 
be dropped “at any time” and “on just terms”—to situations not 
involving a lack of jurisdiction.120 Perhaps that is a fair gloss on Rule 
21; after all, Rule 18 does not allow joinder in excess of jurisdictional 
limits even though the rule itself is not so limited,121 and Rule 82 
disavows the rules’ effects on jurisdiction.122 But if so, joint jurisdiction 
would undermine a long tradition in the lower courts of curing 
jurisdictional defects through Rule 21 and otherwise.123 Professor 
 
 116. Steinman, supra note 20, at 1606–07. 
 117. Id. Professor James Pfander adopts a slightly different formulation that focuses on the 
distinction between claims in the complaint and claims by plaintiffs involving subsequently 
joined parties. See James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for a 
Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 146 (1999) (“[T]he general thrust of section 
1367(b), . . . sympathetically read, operates not as a constraint on what the plaintiff does in the 
initial complaint but on what the plaintiff does later with respect to subsequently joined 
parties.”). 
 118. Steinman, supra note 20, at 1607. 
 119. See Oakley, supra note 16, at 48 (arguing that action-based contamination is 
incompatible with curative opinions like Newman-Green). 
 120. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. Joint jurisdiction would preclude Rule 21’s applicability to diversity 
spoilers. 
 121. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) (“A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-
party claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an 
opposing party.”); 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 1588 (“Clearly the terms of Rule 18 are 
not sufficient to extend the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to state claims . . . .”). 
 122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 82 (“These rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the 
district courts . . . .”). 
 123. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 836 (1989) (“[I]t is apparent 
that the weight of authority favored the view that appellate courts possessed the authority to 
grant motions to dismiss dispensable nondiverse parties.”). 
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Steinman dismisses these cases as using “an economizing shortcut” 
that “need not be viewed as inconsistent” with theories of joint 
jurisdiction,124 but it is hard to see how that can be, and she offers no 
further explanation for why they are not inconsistent. 
Second, the use of joint jurisdiction for the complete-diversity 
requirement is in some tension with the widespread and undisputed 
use of several jurisdiction in connection with other jurisdictional 
doctrines, such as federal-question jurisdiction and the amount-in-
controversy requirement. One could explain that distinction through 
resort to the bias rationale of protecting out-of-state litigants, as 
Allapattah does. As we noted at the outset of this article, however, 
that bias rationale has never been particularly compelling.125 Even 
Professor Steinman recognizes the apparent incoherence of applying 
joint jurisdiction to the complete-diversity requirement but not to 
federal-question cases.126 
Third, as a practical matter, joint jurisdiction imposes costs by 
undermining claims between diverse parties whose only flaw is their 
joinder with a claim between nondiverse parties. With no avenue for 
retaining jurisdiction over them, those claims will have to start anew, 
with all efforts toward resolving them wiped clean. As the Court in 
Newman-Green noted, such an approach of “requiring dismissal after 
years of litigation would impose unnecessary and wasteful burdens on 
the parties, judges, and other litigants waiting for judicial attention.”127 
A different proposal is to stick with several jurisdiction and 
reform or reinterpret the joint-jurisdiction tradition. Professor John 
Oakley has favored the several-jurisdiction approach to complete 
diversity.128 Despite the “action-specific” phrasing of § 1332, he has 
argued that “the claim rather than the civil action is the fundamental 
unit of litigation for purposes of federal jurisdiction.”129 Professor 
Oakley acknowledges that complete diversity is a “significant 
 
 124. Steinman, supra note 20, at 1617–18; see also id. at 1627 (“I nonetheless would permit 
district courts to ‘save’ the claims that are supported by an independent basis of subject-matter 
jurisdiction or that fall within supplemental jurisdiction by dismissing only the unqualified or 
‘offending’ claims.”). 
 125. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Steinman, supra note 20, at 1602 (acknowledging that “this purported distinction 
may not hold-up”). 
 127. Newman-Green Inc., 490 U.S. at 836. 
 128. Oakley, supra note 16, at 45–52. 
 129. Id. at 26. 
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impediment” to his claim-specific proposal,130 but argues that the rule 
is “misunderstood.”131 In his view, “the mandate of the rule of 
complete diversity restricts the scope of the supplemental jurisdiction 
of the district courts in diversity cases. Incomplete diversity does not 
divest the district court of original jurisdiction over claims for which 
supplemental jurisdiction is not required.”132 
We sympathize with Professor Oakley’s position and think he 
may well be correct about the historical basis for claim-specific 
jurisdiction. But, as he resignedly accepts, endorsing his view would 
disrupt a venerable tradition (even if misunderstood) of joint 
jurisdiction dating back at least to Strawbridge. Further, Congress has 
consistently adhered to the complete-diversity tradition when 
amending the diversity statute, and its failure to amend the statute to 
mandate the application of several jurisdiction suggests that the 
statute now should be read as incorporating Strawbridge (even if 
misunderstood). Professor Oakley’s view, then, would also risk 
undermining what may now be the proper interpretation of the 
statute. We think the resulting disruption to Strawbridge is 
intolerable. 
In short, because longstanding doctrine supports both joint 
jurisdiction and several jurisdiction, reconciliation merely by selecting 
one runs up against the wall of precedent of the other. 
III.  THE JURISDICTIONAL-TIMING SOLUTION 
Rather than pick one tradition at the expense of the other, we 
offer a middle road that, with slight tweaking, largely preserves both 
traditions. That middle road begins with a focus on when subject-
matter jurisdiction attaches. The usual rule—the so-called “time-of-
filing rule”—requires federal subject-matter jurisdiction to be 
assessed at the time of filing (or removal). In other words, if complete 
diversity exists at the time of filing, then the court has subject-matter 
jurisdiction even if subsequent events cause diversity to be lacking 
later in the case. 
 
 130. Id. at 26–27 (“If it were true that a district court has no jurisdiction over any claim in a 
diversity case unless every claim in that case is between parties of fully diverse citizenship, 
§ 1332 would indeed be an ‘action-specific’ grant of jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 131. Id. at 27. Professor Oakley also concedes that aggregation is inconsistent with a pure 
claim model, but would reinterpret aggregation rules as a form of supplemental jurisdiction. Id. 
at 47. 
 132. Id. at 49. 
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But the time-of-filing rule neither is itself jurisdictional nor must 
control every case. The time of jurisdictional assessment can be 
shifted to a later stage of the litigation, such as the moment after the 
dismissal of a nondiverse party. This approach allows for a shift from 
the time of filing to the time of cure of the jurisdictional defect, 
thereby transforming several jurisdiction into joint jurisdiction at a 
different time. 
This Part explains how expanding the timeframe of jurisdictional 
assessment in this manner can alleviate the tensions between joint 
and several jurisdiction. This approach allows joint jurisdiction to be 
the prevailing theory of complete diversity, even in cases curing 
diversity defects by dismissing jurisdictional spoilers. Because 
jurisdiction is tested only after a jurisdictional spoiler leaves the suit, 
complete diversity would be present even under a theory of joint 
jurisdiction. 
A. The Usual Rule 
Defects in subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised by any party 
(or even by the court sua sponte) at any time (even for the first time 
on appeal).133 Once a court finds that it lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction, it cannot proceed, for subject-matter jurisdiction is the 
power of the court to act.134 
But these principles present a timing question: At what point in 
time is subject-matter jurisdiction assessed? The traditional rule holds 
that the citizenship of the parties is established at the time of federal-
court invocation, either at the time of filing in federal court or at the 
time of removal to federal court.135 This time-of-filing rule has ancient 
roots; in the 1824 case Mollan v. Torrance,136 the Court held that the 
 
 133. See Dodson, supra note 70, at 60. 
 134. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 384 (1884). 
 135. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3608 (“It has long been hornbook law . . . that whether 
federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction exists is determined by examining the citizenship of 
the parties at the time the action is commenced by filing the complaint with the court as 
prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3.”); id. (“The majority of decisions typically 
require complete diversity to exist at the time the removal petition is filed.”). A substantial 
minority of courts require, for removal actions, that subject-matter jurisdiction exists both at the 
time of removal and at the time of filing to prevent a party-citizenship change in state court 
from creating diversity jurisdiction. Id. § 3723. 
 136. Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 (1824). 
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existence of diversity jurisdiction “depends upon the state of things at 
the time of the action brought.”137 
As it happens, the time-of-filing rule often operates to preserve 
diversity jurisdiction when it otherwise would appear lacking. A 
quintessential application can be found in Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. 
K N Energy, Inc.,138 in which the Court held that the diversity 
jurisdiction acquired at the initiation of a suit cannot be divested on 
account of a subsequent destruction of complete diversity.139 Freeport 
arose from an action for breach of contract that McMoRan Oil & Gas 
Co. and its parent company, Freeport-McMoRan Inc., filed in federal 
court against K N Energy, Inc.140 At the time of filing, complete 
diversity was present because McMoRan and Freeport (citizens of 
Louisiana and Delaware) were diverse from K N (a citizen of Kansas 
and Colorado).141 The district court’s jurisdiction was thus suitably 
premised upon diversity of citizenship under § 1332(a).142 
McMoRan and Freeport later amended their complaint to add 
FMP Operating Company, a Texas limited partnership to which 
McMoRan had assigned its interest in the contract at issue, as a third 
plaintiff.143 FMPO, however, was a citizen of Kansas and Colorado, 
making FMPO a nondiverse party.144 The matter nonetheless 
proceeded to trial, after which the district court entered judgment for 
the plaintiffs.145 On K N’s appeal from that judgment, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and directed that the action 
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.146 The Tenth Circuit reasoned 
that the FMPO’s joinder destroyed complete diversity and thus 
deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the entire action.147 
The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s analysis.148 
Emphasizing “the well-established rule that diversity of citizenship is 
 
 137. Id. at 539; see also Morgan’s Heirs v. Morgan, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 290, 297 (1817) (“We 
are all of opinion that the jurisdiction having once vested, was not devested by the change of 
residence of either of the parties.”). 
 138. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426 (1991) (per curiam). 
 139. Id. at 427–28. 
 140. Id. at 427. 
 141. See McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. K N Energy, Inc., 907 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1023–25. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1023. 
 146. Id. at 1025. 
 147. Id. at 1024–25. 
 148. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) (per curiam). 
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assessed at the time the action is filed,”149 the Court stated that “if 
jurisdiction exists at the time an action is commenced, such 
jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent events,”150 including 
the joinder of a nondiverse dispensable party.151 Concerned that “[a] 
contrary rule could well have the effect of deterring normal business 
transactions during the pendency of what might be lengthy 
litigation,”152 the Court held that “[d]iversity jurisdiction, once 
established, is not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse party to 
the action.”153 The teaching of Freeport is that the time-of-filing rule 
allows a district court to ignore certain postfiling diversity-destroying 
events by fixing the time of jurisdictional assessment at the time of 
filing.154 
The time-of-filing rule protects against gamesmanship (fiddling 
with parties postfiling to force dismissal) and waste (dismissal late in 
the litigation) while promoting uniformity, clarity, and ease of 
application.155 Thus, the usual rule is that a court must assess diversity 
jurisdiction based on the lawsuit as filed, notwithstanding any 
postfiling changes.156 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 428–29. 
 153. Id. at 428. 
 154. The rule applies in other contexts as well, such as postfiling citizenship changes and, 
prior to 1998, the adding of nondiverse parties after removal. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. 
Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 575 (2004) (declining to allow diversity jurisdiction when a nondiverse 
action became diverse through a postfiling change of citizenship of the nondiverse party); 14B 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3723 (noting that judicial practice prior to 1998 was that the 
plaintiff should not oust federal jurisdiction in a removed case by adding a nondiverse 
defendant). Congress occasionally has deviated from the time-of-filing rule. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(7) (2012) (providing that CAFA class-member citizenship may be determined after 
filing if the pleading is not initially, but later becomes, subject to federal jurisdiction). 
 155. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3608; Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 580 (“The time-
of-filing rule is what it is precisely because the facts determining jurisdiction are subject to 
change, and because constant litigation in response to that change would be wasteful.”); Dery v. 
Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1959) (articulating the policy “that the sufficiency of 
jurisdiction should be determined once and for all at the threshold and if found to be present 
then should continue until final disposition of the action”). 
 156. See Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 571 (stating that time-of-filing rule “measures all 
challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction premised upon diversity of citizenship against the state 
of facts that existed at the time of filing”). The time-of-filing rule also applies to the amount-in-
controversy requirement. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 293 
(1938) (“[E]vents occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the amount recoverable, 
whether beyond the plaintiff’s control or the result of his volition, do not oust the district court’s 
jurisdiction once it has attached.”). 
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B. Caterpillar 
This time-of-filing rule is neither constitutionally mandated nor 
itself jurisdictional but rather a manifestation of judicial policy.157 In 
other words, unlike more rigid jurisdictional rules, the time-of-filing 
rule is amenable to modifications and exceptions. 
In the removal context, the time-of-removal rule is a matter of 
statute.158 The removal statute states that a defendant can remove a 
case of which the federal courts “have original jurisdiction” within 
thirty days of the state case “becom[ing] removable.”159 Nevertheless, 
the Court has held the time-of-removal rule to be exorable. In 
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,160 Kentuckian James David Lewis sued 
diverse defendant Caterpillar and nondiverse defendant Whayne in 
state court.161 Diverse party Liberty Mutual later intervened as a 
plaintiff in order to assert claims of its own against both defendants.162 
Because Lewis and Whayne were both Kentucky citizens,163 there was 
a lack of complete diversity in the initial complaint, and thus there 
 
 157. Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 571; 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3608. In removed 
cases, the time-of-removal rule is statutory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
 158. In some circumstances, such as a change in a party’s citizenship, federal courts require, 
as a matter of federal common law, complete diversity to exist at the time of filing as well as at 
the time of removal. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3723. This Article focuses on the 
statutory time-of-removal rule and its violations—for example, circumstances in which complete 
diversity is lacking at the time of removal. 
 159. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446(b)(3). 
 160. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996). Caterpillar builds upon Grubbs v. General 
Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699 (1972), which confronted a case improperly removed to 
federal court on the basis of the presence of the United States as a defendant even though the 
United States was a spurious party. Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 701–02. After the United States was 
dismissed, complete diversity remained in the case, and the district court entered judgment. Id. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that although U.S.-party removal was improper, the district 
court had jurisdiction to enter judgment: “We have concluded that, whether or not the case was 
properly removed, the District Court did have jurisdiction of the parties at the time it entered 
judgment. Under such circumstances the validity of the removal procedure followed may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal . . . .” Id. at 700. The primary difference between Grubbs and 
Caterpillar is that, in Grubbs, the plaintiff failed to timely move to remand, while, in Caterpillar, 
the plaintiff did timely move to remand. See id. at 701; Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 64. Nevertheless, 
the Court in Caterpillar refused to vacate the judgment despite the plaintiff’s timely efforts. 
Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 67. For more on Caterpillar, see Scott Dodson, A Revolution in 
Jurisdiction, in THE LEGACY OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG 137, 147–48 (Scott Dodson ed. 2015). 
 161. Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 64–65. 
 162. Id. at 65. 
 163. Id. 
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would have been a lack of diversity jurisdiction had Lewis filed in 
federal court. The case as filed, therefore, was nonremovable.164 
However, Lewis and Whayne settled their claims in the state 
court.165 Caterpillar then filed a notice of removal in federal district 
court, asserting that Whayne’s dismissal made the case removable on 
the basis of diversity of citizenship.166 Lewis timely moved to remand 
the case back to state court, arguing that Liberty Mutual’s claim 
against Whayne kept Whayne in the case and continued to prevent 
complete diversity.167 Although Lewis was correct,168 the district court 
erroneously denied his motion to remand,169 and the case thereafter 
remained in federal court despite a lack of complete diversity.170 
Several years into the litigation, a settlement agreement reached 
with Liberty Mutual resulted in Whayne’s actual dismissal as a party 
to the action.171 The matter then proceeded to trial solely as to Lewis’s 
claims against the diverse defendant Caterpillar.172 After the jury 
returned a verdict for Caterpillar, the district court entered judgment, 
and Lewis appealed.173 The Sixth Circuit reasoned—consistent with 
the time-of-removal rule—that the absence of complete diversity at 
the time of removal required remand for lack of jurisdiction.174 
Reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that a 
failure of complete diversity at the time of removal “[was] not fatal to 
the ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional requirements are met 
 
 164. A state-court defendant’s ability to remove an action usually hinges upon whether the 
plaintiff could have filed originally in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (allowing 
removal of “[a]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction”); City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 
(1997) (“The propriety of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been 
filed in federal court.”). Accordingly, a defendant may remove a diversity action only when it 
satisfies the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)—including the complete-diversity rule. See 
Dodson, supra note 70, at 61 (observing that § 1441(a) incorporates the complete-diversity rule). 
 165. Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 65. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 70 (noting that “the Sixth Circuit correctly determined that the complete diversity 
requirement was not satisfied at the time of removal”). 
 169. Id. at 65–66. 
 170. Id. at 66–67. 
 171. Id. at 66. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 64, 67. 
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at the time judgment [was] entered.”175 In the underlying action, 
complete diversity was restored once the jurisdictional spoiler, 
Whayne, had been dismissed as a party prior to trial.176 With the 
jurisdictional defect cured, the district court had diversity jurisdiction 
over Lewis’s claims at the time that it entered judgment for 
Caterpillar.177 
However, although the jurisdictional defect was cured by the 
dismissal of the nondiverse party, the case was still improperly 
removed in violation of the time-of-removal rule.178 Nevertheless, the 
Court stated, “[o]nce a diversity case has been tried in federal 
court, . . . considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become 
overwhelming.”179 In other words, the statutory time-of-removal 
requirement, even when properly invoked, can be overridden by 
countervailing practical considerations. 
C. Time Shifting and Its Implications 
Caterpillar was a removal case under the removal statute’s time-
of-removal provision. The time-of-filing rule for cases filed in federal 
court is a judicial creation, and, as such, ought to be modifiable by 
courts even more easily than the statutory time-of-removal rule at 
issue in Caterpillar.180 Although the several-jurisdiction cases of 
Carneal, Horn, and Newman-Green discussed above do not rely upon 
manipulation of the time-of-filing rule to account for their holdings, 
we think they should be understood in the same light as Caterpillar—
as cases allowing manipulation of the time-of-filing rule. 
A subsequent case characterized Caterpillar’s “method of curing 
a jurisdictional defect” to be “an exception to the time-of-filing 
 
 175. Id. at 64. The Court was explicit that “if, at the end of the day and case, a jurisdictional 
defect remains uncured, the judgment must be vacated.” Id. at 76–77. 
 176. Id. at 73. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (stating that although “[t]he jurisdictional defect was cured, . . . a statutory flaw—
Caterpillar’s failure to meet the [removal] requirement that the case be fit for federal 
adjudication at the time the removal petition is filed—remained in the unerasable history of the 
case”). 
 179. Id. at 75. 
 180. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 567 (2004) (acknowledging 
that the time-of-filing rule is a judicial creation); id. at 594 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Grupo 
Dataflux, it should be noted, refused to adopt a new exception to the rule for postfiling changes 
in citizenship of a party. Id. at 582 (majority opinion) (“We decline to endorse a new exception 
to a time-of-filing rule that has a pedigree of almost two centuries.”). 
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rule.”181 We view Caterpillar, Carneal, Horn, and Newman-Green not 
as “exceptions” to the rule but rather as judicial “shifts” of the time 
for jurisdictional assessment (from the time the case first reaches 
federal court to a time after dismissal of a jurisdictional spoiler). The 
semantic difference is important. An exception offers no explanation 
for resolving the tension between joint and several jurisdiction. A 
time shift, however, allows joint jurisdiction to apply with consistent 
force to a case “cured” of incomplete diversity by dismissal of the 
jurisdictional spoiler. 
The idea is to shift the time of jurisdictional assessment to after 
dismissal of the nondiverse party. Evaluating complete diversity as of 
that later time is consistent with joint jurisdiction. If, at that later 
time, any nondiverse party has been dropped, then the case as a 
whole—that is, joint jurisdiction—fulfills the complete-diversity 
requirement as of that time. No jurisdictional spoiler remains to 
contaminate the case. Shifting the timing rule, therefore, obviates 
reliance on several jurisdiction, at least for the complete-diversity 
requirement. 
The upshot to all this is that Allapattah’s contamination theory of 
diversity182 can be consistent with the cure cases of Carneal, Horn, and 
Newman-Green. The key is determining when the court assesses 
whether a contaminant exists. Shifting that determination away from 
the time of filing means that a court, under the right circumstances, 
can assess complete diversity as of the moment after the spoiler is 
dismissed. 
This view of the timing of jurisdictional assessment does require 
some linguistic changes to precedent. Characterizing dismissal of a 
nondiverse party as “preserving” diversity jurisdiction, as some 
justices have written,183 resonates most strongly with notions of 
several jurisdiction, as if the court always had jurisdiction of the 
claims between diverse parties despite the presence of nondiverse 
 
 181. Id. at 572. 
 182. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 564 (2005) (“A failure of 
complete diversity, unlike the failure of some claims to meet the requisite amount in 
controversy, contaminates every claim in the action.”). 
 183. See, e.g., id. at 585 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The cure for improper joinder of a 
nondiverse party is the same as the cure for improper joinder of a plaintiff who does not satisfy 
the jurisdictional amount. In both cases, original jurisdiction can be preserved by dismissing the 
nonqualifying party.”). 
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parties.184 Joint jurisdiction, by contrast, maintains that there was 
never any diversity jurisdiction to preserve in the case until the 
moment the nondiverse party was dismissed. The term “cure” is 
therefore more accurate, for it suggests diversity jurisdiction was 
created by remedying a defect that, until then, prevented diversity 
jurisdiction over any of the claims in the action. 
We make no suggestions on how easy it should be for a court to 
shift the time of jurisdictional assessment from the presumptive time 
of filing to the time of a jurisdictional cure. In Grupo Dataflux v. 
Atlas Global Group, L.P.,185 the Justices were unanimous in deferring 
to the rule’s good policy.186 And, in Caterpillar, the Court confronted 
an unusual removed case that had been tried all the way to a verdict, 
when “considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become 
overwhelming.”187 Rule 21, if it applies to jurisdictional cures, sets the 
arguably less restrictive standard of “just terms.”188 We do not resolve 
this uncertainty here; instead, we merely make the claim that the time 
of jurisdictional assessment can be shifted in a way that allows the 
“cure” cases to be consistent with a joint-jurisdiction theory of 
complete diversity. 
IV.  NEW TENSIONS 
That the timing shift renders joint jurisdiction consistent with the 
“cure” cases does not mean all is well and good. The idea that a court 
in fact lacked subject-matter jurisdiction until a particular postfiling 
time raises new concerns. 
The primary concern is that the court presided over the case—at 
least for a time—without diversity jurisdiction over any of the claims 
in the action. During that time, the court may have issued interim 
orders binding the parties or even a final judgment on the merits with 
respect to one or more parties. Yet under joint jurisdiction, the court 
never in fact had diversity jurisdiction to do those things. Rather, the 
court obtained diversity jurisdiction for the first time only upon 
 
 184. Cf. Oakley, supra note 16, at 48 (“Newman-Green and its antecedents cannot be 
squared with any action-specific conception of § 1332. The dismissal of a jurisdictional spoiler 
‘preserves’ diversity jurisdiction over an already-litigated action to which a non-diverse party 
had been joined.”). 
 185. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004). 
 186. See id. at 594 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 187. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 (1996). 
 188. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
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dismissal of the diversity spoiler. As Justice Kennedy wrote in his 
Newman-Green dissent, the “awesome power of curing actual defects 
in jurisdiction” effectively “confers jurisdiction retroactively on the 
district court.”189 
We question Justice Kennedy’s statement to the extent that his 
use of the term “jurisdiction” encompasses all forms of jurisdiction. 
Even when a court in fact lacks diversity jurisdiction during a failure 
of complete diversity in a putative diversity action, other forms of 
interim jurisdiction can supplement the lack of diversity jurisdiction 
until incomplete diversity is cured. 
Part of the problem in the discourse is that jurisdiction is framed 
as a binary question: a court either has it or it doesn’t. But, in truth, 
jurisdiction is more complicated. We delineate a few examples why 
here. We do not mean to undertake a comprehensive dissertation—
we leave that for another paper. Rather, we identify these forms of 
interim jurisdiction as vehicles for authorizing court adjudicatory 
power during the pendency of incomplete diversity. 
A. Defect Certainty 
Once a court is aware of a true jurisdictional defect, then the 
court cannot proceed190 until the jurisdictional defect has been cured. 
Thus, it would be inappropriate for a court to recognize incomplete 
diversity and yet continue to adjudicate the case on the expectation 
that, later, a cure will occur. But there will still be case pendency and 
court action (even if to issue an order dismissing for lack of 
jurisdiction) during the time of incomplete diversity. Meanwhile, the 
court has jurisdiction to issue interim orders under the jurisdiction-to-
determine-jurisdiction doctrine.191 
This doctrine recognizes a court’s power to issue rulings in order 
to decide whether it has jurisdiction or not.192 The seminal case is 
 
 189. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 839–40 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 190. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (“The 
first and fundamental question [in all matters] is that of jurisdiction.”). 
 191. For a seminal article on the topic, see Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing 
the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491 (1967). For 
an authoritative modern treatment, see KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE §§ 4.4, 5.1 (2d ed. 2009). 
 192. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1580 (4th ed. 1996) (“A federal court always has jurisdiction to 
decide whether it has jurisdiction.”); Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 
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United States v. United Mine Workers,193 in which a district court 
issued preliminary injunctions and, when those injunctions were 
violated, sanctions for the violations. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
found that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 
the case. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the sanctions, explaining 
that “[u]ntil its judgment declining jurisdiction should be announced, 
[the district court] had authority from the necessity of the case to 
make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the 
petition.”194 This authority was confirmed despite the lack of statutory 
subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Thus, the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine can 
support the authority of a court to issue certain orders during a 
pendency of incomplete diversity in a state-law case. In the context of 
incomplete but minimal diversity, the court can diligently and 
expeditiously take steps to adjudicate the jurisdictional defect by 
dismissing the spoiling claims, while simultaneously issuing orders to 
maintain the status quo with respect to other parties. If a cure occurs, 
then those interim orders will have been authorized under the 
jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine. Orders issued after 
the cure would then be authorized by traditional diversity jurisdiction. 
B. Defect Error 
If the court adjudicates a question of subject-matter 
jurisdiction—such as on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion,195 a remand 
motion,196 or anytime through appeal—and erroneously determines 
that jurisdiction exists, then the court effectively has de jure 
jurisdiction until the jurisdictional ruling is reconsidered or 
overturned. 
At the point of challenge, a different jurisdictional doctrine kicks 
in (see scenarios in Sections A and C) to cover the case until the court 
 
U.S. 266, 274 (1926) (“Every court of general jurisdiction has power to determine whether the 
conditions essential to its exercise exist.”). 
 193. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
 194. Id. at 291 (quoting United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906)); cf. Kevin M. 
Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional 
Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301 (2011) (discussing the doctrine of judicial 
primacy, which requires federal courts to address jurisdiction before merits). 
 195. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (providing that a party may assert a defense of lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction by motion). 
 196. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012) (“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any 
defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing 
of the notice of removal . . . .”). 
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adjudicates or avoids the challenge. But a number of doctrines can 
prevent correction, thereby effectively leaving interim orders and 
final judgments—even on the merits—in the absence of complete 
diversity. 
For example, the parties may forgo an appeal or a motion for 
reconsideration, essentially preserving the court’s jurisdictional error. 
Although party waiver, consent, and forfeiture cannot confer subject-
matter jurisdiction,197 the practical effect is that—barring sua sponte 
reconsideration—the court’s orders will stand even in the absence of 
jurisdiction. 
Further, preclusion principles can prevent collateral attack of a 
judgment—even a merits judgment—entered without jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court has allowed judgments on the merits entered 
without subject-matter jurisdiction to stand, even when jurisdiction 
was never challenged.198 This rule of jurisdictional finality accepts the 
fact that jurisdiction was lacking but renders that fact impotent to 
undo what already has been done, even on the merits. 
C. Defect Agnosticism 
Rather than resolve a potential defect in subject-matter 
jurisdiction (thereby also avoiding the scenarios in Subparts A and 
B), the court can choose to remove the spoiling claims on 
nonjurisdictional, nonmerits grounds. This is the doctrine of 
jurisdictional resequencing.199 In Sinochem International Co. v. 
Malaysia International Shipping Corp.,200 for example, the Court 
allowed the dismissal of a case under the nonjurisdictional procedural 
 
 197. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3522:  
[T]he parties cannot confer on a federal court jurisdiction that has not been vested in 
that court by the Constitution and Congress. This means that the parties cannot waive 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction by express consent, or by conduct, or even by 
estoppel; the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is too fundamental a 
concern to be left to the whims and tactical concerns of the litigants. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 198. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963); Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter 
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938); McCormick v. 
Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192, 199 (1825); see also Clermont, supra note 194, at 317 
(“Because the essential issue of jurisdiction or notice was actually litigated and determined, 
even if erroneously, the defendant cannot relitigate the same issue in subsequent litigation.”). 
 199. See Clermont, supra note 194, at 326; Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and 
Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725, 727 (2009); Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of 
Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2001); Peter B. 
Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010). 
 200. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
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doctrine of forum non conveniens without first establishing—despite 
openly questioning—the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction.201 As 
long as the potentially spoiling claim is dismissed on nonmerits 
grounds,202 the court can continue with a case that then has complete 
diversity. 
Under this scenario, a court confronting an arguable defect in 
complete diversity can, in an appropriate case, resequence the issue to 
instead resolve the potentially spoiling claims on nonmerits grounds. 
All orders rendered during that time will be authorized, for the 
absence of diversity jurisdiction was never confirmed. Upon dismissal 
of the potentially spoiling claims, the case attains complete diversity, 
and the court can continue the case assured of diversity jurisdiction. 
D. Defect Ignorance 
If the court is ignorant of a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction, 
and proceeds as if it possesses jurisdiction, then the court has 
jurisdiction until jurisdiction is challenged. For example, perhaps the 
parties’ pleadings allege and admit complete diversity even though 
complete diversity in fact is actually lacking. For much of diversity 
jurisdiction’s history, jurisdiction-in-fact determinations were 
irrelevant because jurisdiction depended instead upon the 
pleadings.203 Indeed, it was not uncommon for courts to enter 
judgment on the merits even with the knowledge that jurisdiction in 
fact was lacking.204 Even today, the pleadings play a large role in 
jurisdictional determinations. The amount in controversy is 
established by the good-faith allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint;205 
 
 201. See id. at 432 (allowing dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine without first 
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction); cf. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 
583–88 (1999) (allowing dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction without first establishing 
subject-matter jurisdiction). 
 202. See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431 (“Jurisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a 
judgment on the merits.” (quoting Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1041, 1041 (7th Cir. 
2006))); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998); see also RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1412 (6th ed. 2009) (“If the 
record fails to disclose a basis for federal jurisdiction, the court must suspend determination of 
the merits of the controversy unless the failure can be cured.” (emphasis added)). 
 203. See Wood v. Mann, 30 F. Cas. 447, 449 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (Story, J.) (“[T]he question 
was, whether the citizenship of the parties, as described in the record, gave the court 
jurisdiction; not whether that citizenship as alleged was true in fact.”). 
 204. See Collins, supra note 27, at 1831–32. 
 205. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961) (“The general federal rule has 
long been to decide what the amount in controversy is from the complaint itself, unless it 
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the actual amount in controversy is irrelevant unless the defendant 
challenges the plaintiff’s allegation.206 The upshot is that the court is 
deemed to have jurisdiction if the pleadings establish it until 
jurisdiction is challenged. If jurisdiction goes unchallenged, then the 
court proceeds with the case, and any order or judgment issued will 
stand until overruled or reconsidered. 
Of course, a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at 
any time during the litigation, including for the first time on appeal, 
and, if so, then a district or appellate court affirming the defect can 
take appropriate measures under the scenarios in Sections A, B, or C. 
E. Retroactive Jurisdiction for Final Judgments 
The most troubling scenario is that in Newman-Green, in which 
an appellate court simply dropped the jurisdictional spoiler to 
preserve a judgment on the merits as to the diverse parties. Justice 
Kennedy’s objection to retroactive jurisdiction seems strongest here, 
as commentators suggest.207 The idea that a court can enter a final 
judgment without complete diversity, and then confer diversity 
jurisdiction retroactively, seems wholly at odds with the notion of 
limited judicial power. 
It may be that a combination of defect ignorance and the 
jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine justifies the result in 
Newman-Green.208 But even if not, the time-of-filing rule calls 
Kennedy’s concern about incomplete-diversity final judgments into 
question. Freeport is a prime example. There, complete diversity 
 
appears or is in some way shown that the amount stated in the complaint is not claimed in good 
faith.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 206. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1008–09 (2006); 
cf. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 552 (2014) (describing a similar 
paradigm for establishing the amount in controversy in removed cases). 
 207. See Taylor Simpson-Wood, Has the Seductive Siren of Judicial Frugality Ceased to 
Sing?: Dataflux and Its Family Tree, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 281, 285, 305 (2005):  
[R]etroactive jurisdiction contravenes the jurisdictional precept that where a court 
lacks the jurisdictional authority to entertain a case, any judgment entered by that 
court is void.  
  . . . . 
  . . . If a district court is without jurisdiction initially, there is no action in existence 
to be considered. It follows, as night does day, that if there is no action, then there is 
no binding judgment for the court to revive by retroactively conferring jurisdiction 
upon itself. 
(footnotes omitted); see also supra note 115. 
 208. Cf. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1217–45 
(2001) (questioning the Court’s jurisdiction-first rhetoric and exploring expanded hypothetical 
jurisdiction). 
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existed at the time of filing, but a later-added nondiverse defendant 
destroyed complete diversity.209 Nevertheless, the court proceeded to 
trial and final judgment despite incomplete diversity.210 The Supreme 
Court held that to be proper, stating that “[d]iversity jurisdiction, 
once established, is not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse party 
to the action.”211 Freeport thus allows a court to enter a final judgment 
even in a case that in fact lacks complete diversity merely because the 
time-of-filing rule fixes the assessment of diversity at an earlier time. 
This strikes us as substantially undermining Kennedy’s concern about 
a court entering a final judgment without complete diversity. 
In the end, perhaps the outer boundary for when a court can 
assess jurisdictional compliance belongs at final judgment, and 
Newman-Green was wrongly decided. We mean not to resolve but to 
observe. Suffice it to say that the applicability of joint jurisdiction and 
time shifting does create new concerns regarding assumed 
jurisdiction. But these new concerns do not mean that joint 
jurisdiction is a failure; rather, they mean only that additional thought 
is needed in these areas. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has created a conundrum for lower federal 
courts confronted with violations of the requirement of complete 
diversity in putative diversity actions. On one hand, the Court has 
endorsed the application of joint jurisdiction, which would require 
dismissal of an entire action—including those claims over which 
diversity jurisdiction would have existed if only the nondiverse parties 
had not been joined. On the other hand, the Court has endorsed the 
application of several jurisdiction, under which dismissal would be 
limited to claims between nondiverse parties; diversity jurisdiction 
over claims between diverse parties would endure. In the end, 
whether a claim survives a failure of complete diversity will come 
down to a lower federal court’s fortuitous preference for one of these 
traditions over the other. 
Although each tradition boasts substantial doctrinal support, 
neither the case-specific approach of joint jurisdiction nor the claim-
specific approach of several jurisdiction offers an optimal method of 
 
 209. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 427 (1991) (per curiam). 
 210. Id. at 428. 
 211. Id. 
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responding to a complete-diversity violation. The key to reconciling 
these competing traditions, as we argue here, rests somewhere in the 
middle. By shifting the time of jurisdictional assessment from the time 
of filing to the time of cure of the jurisdictional defect, and invoking 
other jurisdictional authorizations—such as the jurisdiction-to-
determine-jurisdiction doctrine and the jurisdictional-resequencing 
doctrine—a federal court can remain faithful to the established 
tradition of joint jurisdiction while securing the finality, efficiency, 
and other good outcomes that would be available under several 
jurisdiction. 
 
